The expansion of Israeli ground operations into the Gaza Strip in late October set the stage for a phase of intense urban combat that will test doctrine, logistics and the limits of proportionality in a densely populated theatre. Israeli spokespeople described a deliberate enlarging of ground activity following weeks of air campaigns, and observers reported tanks and infantry operating inside Gaza as the military shifted from largely stand off operations to combined arms activity on the ground.
From an operational perspective urban Gaza presents multiple compounding challenges. The enclave’s population density, narrow streets and multistory residential blocks constrain maneuver for armored formations and expose them to small arms, anti‑tank guided weapons and improvised explosive devices. Hamas and other armed groups have long prepared layered defensive belts including tunnel networks and hardpoints within built up areas that favor defenders in close quarters fights. These conditions force attackers to slow down, clear building by building, and depend heavily on infantry, combat engineers and close air support for breaching and clearance. Analysts tracking early raids and incursions noted the IDF conducting combined infantry, armor and engineering operations in contested neighbourhoods as commanders sought to mitigate ambush and IED threats.
Technology is altering the character of this urban fight but it is not a panacea. The October 7 assault demonstrated how uncrewed aerial systems can be used by nonstate actors to degrade sensors, suppress remote weapon stations and provide reconnaissance for coordinated ground attacks. Reporting and open source footage indicate that explosive and surveillance drones were a key enabler of the Hamas assault and complicated Israel’s defensive posture in the opening phase of the war.
On the other side, modern militaries layer persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets with precision fires, electronic warfare and targeting chains to accelerate kill‑chains and reduce exposure of friendly forces. In an urban environment that acceleration brings acute risks. Faster targeting cycles and higher strike volumes increase the chance of mistaken identity and collateral damage when fighters and civilians share the same buildings and streets. Real time ISR can help discriminate targets but only when human analysis, accurate corroboration and robust rules of engagement remain central to the decision loop. The early weeks of the campaign highlighted these tensions between technological reach and the constraints imposed by civilian presence.
Communications disruption and the humanitarian fallout complicate both combat and protection of civilians. A widespread blackout of internet and phone services in Gaza during the escalation severely hampered civilian movement, emergency medical coordination and the ability of aid organisations to verify needs and deliver supplies. Hospitals reported dire shortages of fuel, medicine and surgical capacity while agencies warned that repeated strikes and orders to evacuate put medical facilities and patients at extraordinary risk. Those conditions complicate the lawful execution of operations that require warnings and safe corridors, because communications and fuel shortfalls limit both the movement of civilians and the ability of humanitarian actors to operate.
Tactically the conflict will favour small unit leadership, integrated engineer support and careful urban clearance drills. Expect heavy reliance on mapping and exploitation of tunnel networks, increased use of armoured engineering vehicles and the employment of small uncrewed systems for clearance and door insertion. But every adaptation at the tactical level produces political and strategic effects. High rates of destruction and civilian displacement will shape global reactions, complicate post‑conflict stabilization and harden security dilemmas across the region. Those second order effects will matter far longer than any localized tactical gain.
Policy makers and militaries must confront several immediate imperatives. First, establish and resource credible humanitarian corridors and communication channels so civilians can move and aid can flow. Second, enforce and publicise rigorous targeting protocols that preserve human review where feasible and document compliance with international humanitarian law. Third, prepare contingency plans for urban stabilization and essential service restoration to reduce the long tail of instability once kinetic operations subside. The interplay between modern technologies and urban terrain can provide operational advantage, but it also increases complexity and the political costs of error.
Long term the campaign offers a sobering reminder that uncrewed systems and advanced ISR shift but do not erase the human and moral dimensions of urban warfare. Militaries will learn and adapt tactics, but states and international institutions must also invest in norms, verification mechanisms and post‑conflict reconstruction frameworks to reduce the blowback of protracted urban destruction. If technology is to reduce harm it must be integrated into doctrine that privileges civilian protection as an operational requirement, not an afterthought.