As Kyiv prepares to sustain operations through winter and to preserve the option of future offensive maneuvers, one constraint stands out above most others: artillery ammunition. Months of high-rate fires have drawn down stocks, forcing Ukrainian units to ration rounds, prioritise targets, and adapt tactics to a lower rate of expendable firepower. Evidence from the front in 2023 makes clear that this is not a local hiccup but a systemic challenge that shapes operational planning across multiple sectors.
Why the shortage matters operationally. Modern positional and breakthrough operations in this war are an artillery contest. Massed and sustained indirect fires create the temporal windows for maneuver, suppress enemy fires, and break prepared defenses. When batteries must limit rounds per target or postpone fire missions, commanders lose operational tempo. Units then rely more on small unit actions, close assault, and high-risk manoeuvres to achieve what fires would previously have secured. The consequence is a higher casualty risk, slower advances, and a greater demand for precision strikes to substitute for volume.
What is constraining supply. The shortfall is not simply a failure of will among partners. Industrial constraints are real and enduring. Modern production of large-calibre shells relies on heavy machine tools, specialised propellant capacity, and long lead times to expand lines. Western defence procurement and production had not been sized for a sustained, attritional artillery war at the scale of the Russia Ukraine conflict, and ramping capacity cannot be instant. The bottleneck is often the large, specialized machining and explosives capacity rather than raw steel. That structural reality means supply increases require months and in some cases years of investment, not weeks.
Short term mitigations: force multipliers and substitutes. Facing constrained stocks, Ukrainian forces have become adept at blending conventional fires with lower cost and asymmetric tools that increase effects per expendable unit. Two categories stand out.
1) Unmanned systems and loitering munitions. Cheap, locally produced FPV kamikaze drones have emerged as a force multiplier that can attack high value targets at low cost. Indigenous groups and small manufacturers scaled production of these FPV attack drones through 2022 and 2023, producing inexpensive munitions at rates that, while not replacing tube artillery, can destroy vehicles, knock out observation posts, and harass fortified positions at a fraction of the cost of a single shell. These systems also serve as an economy of force when used selectively against targets that would otherwise demand expensive or numerous artillery rounds.
2) Precision rockets and long range rockets. Systems such as HIMARS and guided rockets magnify the combat effect of single munitions by striking command nodes, logistics hubs, and ammunition dumps at depth. When a precision rocket neutralises an enemy ammunition or command node, it can produce effects disproportionate to the rounds expended. Western-supplied MLRS systems were introduced earlier in the conflict and remain central to Ukraine’s efforts to achieve high value interdiction with constrained stocks.
Drones are not an artillery panacea. Their strengths and limitations must be acknowledged. Reconnaissance UAVs have improved target acquisition and artillery correction, allowing more judicious use of precious shells. But drones are vulnerable to electronic warfare, and their attrition rates can be high in contested airspace. Similarly, loitering munitions buy tactical advantages but do not scale to sustain the kind of high-volume suppression fires that heavy artillery provides. The net effect is complementarity rather than substitution: unmanned systems reduce some demand on artillery but cannot eliminate the strategic need for industrially produced rounds.
Industrial and institutional responses to close the gap. Recognising the structural nature of the problem, Kyiv and allied partners have pursued three parallel tracks: procure existing stocks, expand production in partner countries, and seed domestic production. By late 2023 Ukraine hosted industry fora and announced steps to localise certain production lines and scale domestic maintenance and production capacity. These are sensible long term responses, but they will not immediately erase shortages on the front. Domestic lines and multinational joint ventures can materially improve resilience over the medium term, but they require technology transfers, investment, quality control, and safe handling infrastructure for energetic materials.
Strategic implications and recommendations. First, technology adaptation is necessary and effective, but it cannot replace the industrial base required for high-volume artillery warfare. Policymakers should therefore prioritise a dual track of immediate ammunition deliveries while financing near term industrial capacity expansions. Second, investments that increase the lethality per round will pay off. That means expanding precision munitions, improving targeting chains that use UAVs and reconnaissance assets to reduce wasteful shots, and fielding counter-EW measures that protect guidance and communications. Third, logistic and maintenance support for both conventional and unmanned systems is essential. Systems like HIMARS require ammunition resupply and spares. FPV and loitering drone deployments require steady component lines and secure training pipelines. Finally, partners should focus on supply chain resilience for explosives and specialized machine tools because those are the non-obvious chokepoints that slow ramp up.
Conclusion. Winter will not create new strategic options. It will accentuate existing constraints and reward planning horizons that combine short term improvisation with a clear path to industrial resilience. Ukraine’s tactical ingenuity with drones and precision systems demonstrates adaptability. But armies cannot out-innovate attrition indefinitely. Sustained operational freedom in the coming months depends on steady ammunition flows, industrial scale production increases among allies, and a pragmatic doctrine that fuses cheap expendables with careful use of scarce heavy munitions. The policy choice for partners is therefore simple in logic and hard in practice: invest in both the factories and the technologies that make each shell count.