The war in Ukraine has accelerated a tectonic shift in how modern military capability is provisioned. Governments remain the primary suppliers and underwriters of large-scale combat systems. At the same time private technology firms are moving from niche suppliers and integrators to direct providers of weapons, sensors and command software. This movement is neither accidental nor temporary. It is the result of changing battlefield requirements, large pools of venture capital, and a procurement ecosystem that is finally learning to buy speed and software in addition to steel and motors.
Anduril Industries is a useful case study of this transformation. Founded as a Silicon Valley defense start-up, Anduril won a high‑visibility U.S. Special Operations Command systems integration partner award in January 2022 that placed the company at the center of counter‑drone integration efforts. That contract formalized Anduril’s transition from a small innovator to a major defense supplier and signaled the Pentagon’s willingness to work at scale with a new generation of tech companies.
Product‑first engineering and software platforms are the firm’s distinguishing features. Anduril’s Lattice software is designed to tie sensors, shooters and autonomous vehicles into a single operating picture that can be updated rapidly in the field. The firm publicized and iterated versions of its Ghost reconnaissance aircraft through 2023, including a Ghost‑X upgrade unveiled at DSEI in September 2023 that emphasized longer endurance, higher payload capacity and improved navigation resilience. Importantly, company spokespeople acknowledged that Ghost platforms have been used in combat theaters, including Ukraine, a point that highlights how commercial systems are being evaluated and improved under the pressure of actual conflict.
That on‑the‑ground iteration model is a defining feature of the commercialization trend. Traditional procurement operates on long cycles, detailed specification and largely offline testing. The new model resembles commercial software development: push hardware and code into the hands of users, collect feedback, push rapid updates and scale what works. For buyers such as Kyiv this model has clear appeal. Ukrainian ministries and field commanders have shown an appetite for rapid acquisition and adaptation of novel systems, creating a demand signal that private firms are eager to meet. Observers have described Ukrainian leadership’s approach to defense innovation as startup friendly, encouraging quick prototyping, local partnerships and rapid absorption of commercial tech.
The entry of private firms into direct battlefield supply chains produces several strategic consequences. First, it diversifies supply and increases the number of actors who can scale production of certain systems quickly. The immediate example most commentators note is satellite communications. SpaceX’s Starlink terminals became a crucial communications layer for Ukraine early in the war, demonstrating how a commercial remote sensing and connectivity provider can become a frontline enabler. That relationship also exposed a new fragility: corporate policies and technical constraints can affect operational use and can create political friction when a private owner controls a choke point in the communications layer.
Second, corporate speed comes with new operational risks. Systems developed rapidly and iterated in combat will inevitably encounter unanticipated failure modes in contested environments such as electronic warfare, adverse terrain or degraded logistical contexts. Manufacturers and militaries will need to codify how to test resilience, how to share failure data without compromising operational security and how to accept a different risk calculus than that used for decades of slow, conservative procurement. Anduril’s public references to lessons learned and iterative upgrades underscore how these dynamics play out in real time.
Third, private provision raises legal and normative questions. When a private firm supplies lethal or dual‑use systems across borders, responsibility for escalation management, end use and compliance with export controls becomes more complex. Governments shipping systems purchased from commercial firms still bear the legal and political responsibility for their use. At the same time, firms may have operational leverage that states do not expect to cede. The Starlink experience showed how corporate discretion over service parameters can have battlefield effects and diplomatic reverberations.
Finally, the economics of deterrence are shifting. Low‑cost, software‑defined systems change the calculus of attrition and escalation. Providers like Anduril pitch mass production, rapid upgrades and software‑driven interoperability as answers to the expensive, bespoke systems of the past. For allies that means new avenues to bolster partners short of sending heavy formations. For adversaries it means Western industrial advantage is becoming as much about chip supply, software toolchains and cloud connectivity as it is about tanks or jets. The result is not a single dominant model but a hybrid market where legacy primes coexist with fast, venture‑backed entrants. Evidence of this convergence is visible in how Anduril and other firms have sought both commercial investment and formal defense partnerships.
Policymakers must adapt. Procurement rules that reward lowest‑cost, slowest delivery and that assume monolithic suppliers will not suffice in an era where software and modular hardware proliferate. Regulators will need clearer frameworks for export control and end‑use monitoring that account for software updates and remote capability changes. Militaries will need doctrines that accept iterative fielding, and they will need to build institutional processes for rapid correction when commercial systems fail under fire.
For Ukraine the incursion of private firms like Anduril has been a force multiplier and a test case. For the United States and its allies the lesson is broader: in future conflicts the ability to harness commercial speed at scale while managing the attendant operational, legal and political risks will be a defining part of national competitive advantage. Private companies will not replace states as security guarantors. They will, however, reshape how states equip, connect and sustain modern forces. How governments write the rules for that relationship will matter at least as much as which systems are sent to a frontline in any single war.