The lull that opened in Yemen in 2022 was never a stable peace. What began as a pragmatic set of measures to reduce violence, restore commercial lifelines and create breathing room for diplomacy has proved brittle when exposed to broader regional shocks and enduring local fractures. The partial truce delivered important humanitarian gains, including restored commercial traffic through major ports and resumed humanitarian flights, but it did not resolve the political, economic and security drivers that have sustained Yemen’s war.
Three structural dynamics explain the truce’s fragility. First, the truce was primarily a management tool rather than a negotiated settlement. It froze some military activity and allowed humanitarian access, but it left core questions of governance, revenue sharing and territorial control unresolved. In the absence of credible, mutually acceptable sequencing toward a nationwide ceasefire and political transition, incentives to revert to coercion remained strong for all parties.
Second, Yemen’s conflict is deeply enmeshed in regional competition. External patronage has long amplified Houthi military capacity and political resilience. Investigations and panel reporting have documented persistent routes and networks that supplied materiel and technical support to armed actors in Yemen, complicating efforts to demilitarize the conflict and underscoring how regional stakes can trump local peace incentives. That external dimension means shocks outside Yemen reshuffle calculations inside it.
Third, the conflict landscape inside Yemen is fragmented. The internationally recognized authorities, southern separatists and multiple local power brokers continue to jockey for advantage, generating multiple centers of grievance and competition over ports, customs revenues and aid flows. The truce did not knit these actors into a single political bargain. Instead it created asymmetric gains for some and exposed distributional tensions that can rapidly become sources of renewed violence when external conditions harden.
Those external conditions hardened dramatically late in 2023 and into early 2024. Houthi leaders recalibrated strategy in response to heightened regional tensions, expanding attacks on ships in the southern Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. The campaign targeted commercial vessels and occasionally naval assets, drawing a coordinated warning from a coalition of states and prompting kinetic responses from naval coalitions and partnered air and sea strikes. These actions turned the truce’s limited gains into leverage for military escalation rather than a bridge to talks.
The international reaction has two short term effects that matter for the truce. It increases pressure on the Houthis by degrading some of their maritime strike capabilities and by interrupting weapons flows, but it also raises the political stakes for the movement and its external backers. Military pressure can produce tactical restraint, but without a parallel diplomatic pathway that addresses Houthi political demands and the security concerns of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, pressure risks hardening maximalist positions rather than prompting negotiation. Intelligence and interdiction successes have material impact, yet they do not substitute for credible political guarantees.
Policy choices over the next phase should combine three priorities. First, expand the political architecture beyond a narrow truce to a structured, UN‑facilitated sequence that links security de‑escalation to specific, verifiable political and economic steps. The international community must help underwrite credible sequencing so concessions from each side do not leave them exposed.
Second, tighten interdiction of illicit arms flows while broadening incentives for restraint. Seizures that demonstrate denial of routes and components undermine the military calculus that benefits maritime attacks. At the same time, sanctions and military pressure should be calibrated with diplomacy and offers of economic relief tied to verifiable behavioral changes, so that there is a tangible prize for de‑escalation.
Third, shore up Yemeni economic governance and humanitarian channels. Stabilizing fuel and food imports, protecting port operations and ensuring transparent management of revenues are political acts with direct security returns. They reduce the zero‑sum competition over resources that has repeatedly punctured ceasefires in the past.
The truce’s fragility is not merely a Yemeni problem. The war’s spillovers are now a maritime security challenge with global economic consequences. That reality creates both the leverage and the responsibility for a multilateral strategy that blends credible military denial of disruptive capabilities with sustained, inclusive diplomacy and tangible economic incentives for a durable settlement. Without that dual approach there is a real risk that temporary pauses will become a cycle of episodic violence followed by short lulls rather than the foundation for lasting peace.