Hypersonics is not a technical hobby. It is a strategic problem set that reaches from laboratory materials science to the credibility of deterrence. In recent years Beijing and Moscow have demonstrated operational and near-operational systems that change timelines for decision makers and compress warning windows for forces in theater. The United States has responded with several parallel development tracks that show promise in research but uneven progress in fielding and procurement.
The capability gap that preoccupied Washington a few years ago is now a complex mixture of advances and setbacks. On one front the Air Force tested an air-launched boost-glide prototype in the western Pacific in March 2024 as part of an end-to-end flight series intended to exercise operational concepts and gather data for follow-on efforts. The test underscored learning from flight campaigns but also arrived amid congressional decisions that reallocated funding away from that specific program and toward other hypersonic concepts.
At the same time the United States has matured air-breathing hypersonic technology. The DARPA HAWC program delivered sustained scramjet-powered flights and multiple successful tests that demonstrated cruise at speeds above Mach 5 and provided a technical on-ramp for service development of air-breathing hypersonic cruise missiles. That result matters strategically because air-breathing designs promise different operational tradeoffs from boost-glide vehicles, including potentially lower per-unit cost, reusable design lessons, and persistent mission profiles suited to regional strike and prompt long-range fires.
The Army and Navy efforts to develop a common All-Up-Round and field a Conventional Prompt Strike capability have been more iterative. Early flight campaigns exposed fragility in hardware and test infrastructure and produced schedule slips relative to initial goals. These programs are now a stretch between prototype learning and the logistics of serial production, canisterization, and ship or ground integration. Congress has been vigilant about procurement schedules and has pushed services to justify procurement timing as they balance the needs of other modernization efforts.
Why is this an urgent policy issue? China and Russia are not pursuing hypersonics only as a technical prestige project. Beijing has tested glide vehicles and long-range prototypes that the U.S. intelligence community and independent analysts treat as operational or near operational. Some Chinese tests demonstrated trajectories that complicated existing tracking paradigms and raised alarms about novel flight profiles, including orbital or near-orbital maneuvers. Russia has fielded a mix of strategic glide systems and introduced air-launched aeroballistic weapons into combat use, showing a willingness to employ these systems in active conflict. Those developments alter the offense defense calculus for U.S. forces and partners across the Indo Pacific and in Europe.
Technical realities matter for strategy. Hypersonic glide bodies face exceptional thermal, materials, and guidance problems. Air-breathing scramjet vehicles face engine start and sustained-combustion challenges. Neither path promises a quick, cheap fix. The United States has generated valuable test data, though test failure and delayed schedules remain part of the programmatic record. That pattern is not a reason for capitulation. It is a roadmap for prioritizing investment where it reduces program risk and shortens the path from prototype to practical capability.
Policy makers must treat hypersonics as a system of systems problem rather than a single weapon procurement line. That means investing in three linked areas. First, accelerate sustainably funded flight testing and production engineering so designs graduate from lab demonstration to reliable field units. Second, invest in sensing and command networks that integrate space, sea and aerial sensors to compress detection to decision timelines. Third, align acquisition incentives so that industry and services are rewarded for survivable, maintainable, and cost-effective solutions rather than headline tests alone. Each of these priorities affects not only the speed of fielding but also the credibility of deterrence.
Diplomacy also belongs in the toolkit. Hypersonic systems create incentives for quantitative and qualitative arms competition that could be stabilizing or destabilizing depending on transparency and norms. Confidence building measures around testing notifications, risk reduction dialogues, and even limited data exchanges on nonnuclear uses could reduce brinkmanship while the technology matures. Those are hard conversations, but avoiding them risks ritual escalation in which each side reflexively builds more capability to avoid being perceived as behind.
Operationally, the United States should pursue a portfolio approach. Boost-glide concepts provide advantages in surprise and terminal maneuver. Air-breathing cruise hypersonics offer flexibility for theater strike and potentially more sustainable production economics. Conventional long-range hypersonic weapons, integrated with improved ISR and resilient logistics, can strengthen integrated deterrence in contested regions. This portfolio will not be cheap. It will require patience, a realistic testing cadence, and honest program metrics that emphasize field reliability over isolated test headlines.
If there is a single strategic point to carry forward it is this. Hypersonic technology will not eclipse other forms of long-range precision fires and layered air defense. It will complement them. The United States must accept that catching China and Russia in hypersonics is not a single sprint. It is a sustained program of engineering, procurement reform, sensor integration, and diplomatic engagement. Getting that mix right matters for deterrence, for the alliance network, and for the stability of the security environment that will shape decisions for decades.