The disappearance of Wagner’s independent brand after the 2023 deaths of its founders did not mark the end of Russia’s mercenary footprint in Africa. Instead it signalled a deliberate transformation: an effort by the Russian state to fold paramilitary influence into a more formal, ministry-controlled structure now operating under the name Africa Corps. This is less a cosmetic rename than a strategic recalibration aimed at preserving Moscow’s leverage across the Sahel and Central Africa while reshaping how that leverage is held and used.
What matters about the Africa Corps is not only that fighters formerly associated with Wagner continue to operate in the same theatres. It is that the architecture of Russian power there is changing from deniable private action to overt state instrument. Analysts and reporting have documented a shift in command and sponsorship toward the Russian Ministry of Defence, with recruitment drives and small initial deployments framed as ministry-led expeditionary activity rather than purely private contracting. That institutional shift collapses a layer of plausible deniability Moscow once relied upon and makes the Kremlin more directly accountable for the actions of these forces.
On the ground the Africa Corps has started small and pragmatic. January and February 2024 saw reported deployments of roughly 100 personnel to Burkina Faso as an initial contingent to provide presidential and training security, with similar small footprints reported in Niger and continued Russian activity in the Central African Republic and Libya. These limited deployments are deliberate. They offer host regimes protective cadres and training while minimising political and logistical exposure for Moscow. At the same time they anchor Russian presence in key states that have turned away from France and, in several cases, from broader Western security partnerships.
The business model that made Wagner attractive to client regimes appears intact in substance if not in name. Control over security services is paired with access to mineral concessions, infrastructure deals and other economic arrangements that can underwrite deployed forces. Independent reporting and analyst work show that the same incentives that drove resource-for-security deals under Wagner remain central to the Africa Corps era. This is important for two reasons. First, it provides a revenue stream that can sustain foreign deployments despite Western sanctions pressure. Second, it creates durable, elite-level clientelism between Moscow and host governments that is difficult for outside actors to unwind.
Yet the rebranding brings tradeoffs. Folding former mercenary networks into a ministry-controlled corps reduces operational flexibility and increases political risk for Moscow, because abuses or destabilising behaviour can no longer be plausibly disowned. Western and multilateral scrutiny of human rights violations and resource exploitation will now point more directly at the Russian state apparatus rather than at a semiprivate actor. That may constrain some behaviour, but it will not eliminate incentives to use asymmetric tools of influence where they serve strategic aims.
The Africa Corps also changes the strategic calculus beyond Africa. Western and Ukrainian officials warned in May 2024 that Moscow has redeployed or re-tasked some units associated with the Africa Corps toward operations in Ukraine, illustrating the dual-use utility of the force and the Kremlin’s ability to shift scarce, experienced personnel between theatres. If correct, the redeployment shows the Corps is not purely an Africa-focused instrument but part of a global Russian expeditionary toolkit that can be pushed toward higher-intensity operations when domestic priorities demand it. That flexibility makes the Africa Corps a more integrated element of Russian power projection than Wagner ever formally was.
For African governments that contract Russian assistance the calculus is straightforward: short-term regime security and a partner willing to legitimise or prop up fragile juntas. For regional neighbours and external actors the calculus is geopolitical. Russia’s visible state-backed footprint fills vacuums left by retrenchment or withdrawal of European forces, especially French contingents, and complicates Western attempts to fashion stabilising international partnerships. Moscow is buying time and influence by aligning military assistance with elite economic concessions. The outcome is likely to be a patchwork of long-term dependencies rather than coherent stability.
Policy responses will need to account for three realities. First, the Africa Corps is not an ephemeral private actor; it is an arm of Russian state strategy and will be treated as such by host states and by increasingly sceptical international observers. Second, the model combines limited force presence with economic linkages that can be hard to break without offering credible alternatives to host governments. Third, the Corps is interchangeable across theatres: personnel, doctrine and logistics can be reallocated if Moscow decides other fronts require reinforcement. Western strategy must therefore move beyond sanctions and denunciations to coordinated offers that combine security assistance, resource governance support, and political risk-sharing with African partners.
Long term, the rebrand into Africa Corps represents an attempt to make Russia’s proxy empire more resilient and less opaque. That makes it more durable and more consequential for regional stability. Democracies and international institutions will have to adapt to a landscape where state-backed expeditionary forces operate under formal military auspices, not simply through shadowy networks. The question for 2024 and beyond is not whether Russia will be present in Africa. It is how entrenched that presence will become, and whether the international community can craft strategic responses that blunt predatory economic practices, protect civilians and preserve African agency in choosing security partnerships.