The Houthi campaign against commercial shipping and selective seizures of vessels has evolved into a form of economic warfare that extends beyond the battlefield in Yemen. By mid‑2024 the group had combined direct attacks at sea with tighter control over ports and fuel flows on land, producing a coercive toolkit that generates revenue, constrains opponents, and projects influence far beyond Yemen’s borders.
The maritime dimension is now unmistakable. The seizure of the cargo ship Galaxy Leader in November 2023 signaled a shift from attacks to targeted boardings and detentions that combine operational sophistication with propaganda value. The Galaxy Leader episode exposed how the Houthis can use a single high profile seizure to freeze commercial activity, complicate insurance and charter arrangements, and extract political leverage.
Kinetic strikes at sea have served both as coercion and bargaining chips. The sinking of the bulk carrier Rubymar after it was struck in February 2024 produced an environmental hazard and a psychological shock to ship operators and insurers, illustrating the asymmetric returns the Houthis can achieve with relatively limited means. Similarly, missile strikes on tankers and oil product carriers have raised the perceived cost of transiting the southern Red Sea and Bab al‑Mandeb, prompting rerouting and insurance effects across global supply chains.
The pattern of attacks has included strikes on tankers carrying crude or refined products. In May 2024 a Panamanian‑flagged oil tanker was hit by an anti‑ship missile off Yemen, an incident that underscored the operational reach of Houthi systems and the direct threat to energy shipments traversing the corridor. These incidents are not random. They are calibrated to disrupt energy flows, raise operational costs for shippers, and create bargaining space for the group on political issues it prizes.
At the same time the Houthis have leveraged their control of key ports and distribution networks inside Yemen. By restricting or physically redirecting fuel offloads and by applying taxes and informal fees at ports, Houthi authorities and associated commercial actors extract rents from an import‑dependent economy. That extraction performs dual functions. It finances governance and military activity in Houthi areas while giving the group a mechanism to create localized shortages or price pressures that can be presented as leverage in domestic or international negotiations. The effect is to monetize insecurity: attacks and seizures increase shipping costs and insurance premiums, and control on land converts those higher premiums and limited supply into predictable revenue streams for the group.
International responses have been military and diplomatic. From January 2024 onward U.S., U.K. and allied naval and air actions sought to blunt the maritime campaign and protect merchant shipping, while strikes against Houthi sites were intended to degrade the group’s ability to threaten vessels transiting the Red Sea. Those responses have so far had mixed operational effects but they have not eliminated the leverage that arises from Houthi control of ports and distribution on land. In short, kinetic responses counter one axis of threat at sea but do little to remove the economic infrastructure that sustains the campaign.
The consequences are strategic and enduring. First, the costs of protecting shipping and the incentive to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope impose real economic burdens on trade and energy markets. Major carriers periodically rerouted vessels and insurers raised premiums for Red Sea transits, actions that transmitted the conflict into higher freight rates and longer delivery times. Second, environmental damage from attacks and sinkings creates long term liabilities and heightens political pressure on external actors to respond. Third, the Houthis’ dual use of maritime coercion and port revenue means conventional attempts to isolate the group economically are complicated by the fact that their earnings are often embedded in legitimate import flows and local distribution networks.
Policy responses must therefore be layered. Naval escort and strike capabilities are necessary to protect immediate freedom of navigation and to impose costs on attacking units. At the same time targeted measures should aim at the economic underpinnings of the campaign: identifying and disrupting illicit fuel networks, closing loopholes in ship‑to‑ship transfers, and using financial instruments to limit the ability of sanctioned actors to monetize imports. Diplomatic channels, including third party mediators such as Oman, are essential to de‑escalation because transactional bargains that offer predictable commercial access in return for halting maritime attacks are often more sustainable than cycles of strike and reprisal.
Finally, any effective strategy must reckon with humanitarian risk. Fuel is the lifeblood of Yemen’s economy and public services. Policies that close commercial channels without credible alternatives risk deepening shortages for civilians and amplifying instability. International actors therefore face a difficult trade off: they must reduce the Houthis’ ability to weaponize fuel and shipping while protecting the civilian population that already bears the costs of fragmentation. A durable solution will blend maritime security, targeted financial measures, and credible commercial pathways that keep humanitarian supplies flowing outside of Houthi predation.
The seizure and attack campaign in the Red Sea is not an episodic nuisance. It is an integrated strategy that mixes military action at sea with economic control on land. Understanding it as economic warfare clarifies the policy agenda: protect shipping, choke the revenue lines that fund coercion, sustain humanitarian access, and pursue mediated political compromises that remove incentives for further maritime coercion.