The offensive launched by the Three Brotherhood Alliance has moved beyond symbolic raids and become a strategic challenge to the junta’s ability to govern. Since October 2023 the coalition of the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army and the Arakan Army has consolidated control over a string of townships and, in early August, asserted full control of Lashio and the junta’s Northeastern Regional Command headquarters. Those battlefield gains represent the first collapse of a regional command headquarters and a direct threat to the regime’s capacity to administer territory in the northeast.
That shift matters for three interlocking reasons. First, logistics and command. The loss of a regional command degrades the military’s local command and control, its ability to project force along key highways, and its capacity to secure supply lines to forward garrisons. Control of hubs close to the Chinese border also reshapes the operational environment by offering the alliance easier access to cross border markets and routes that the junta has traditionally used.
Second, legitimacy and narrative. The capture of a major regional headquarters punctures the junta’s claim to monopoly control and amplifies the political narrative that the generals cannot govern the country. Analysts have warned that accumulating defeats at the front lines could cascade into a broader political crisis for the regime if they accelerate defections, erode internal cohesion, and cut off tax and revenue bases. Those are structural pressures that cannot be repaired quickly by tactical counterattacks.
Third, the humanitarian and social effects of this phase of fighting are already profound. The intensification of hostilities since late 2023 has produced very large internal displacement and humanitarian needs across multiple states and regions. That displacement amplifies popular grievances against the junta while complicating any centralized effort to reassert civil administration in contested areas. The humanitarian dimension is therefore both a humanitarian crisis and a strategic liability for the military.
Despite these gains, the path to an immediate collapse of the junta remains uncertain. The military retains asymmetric advantages in heavy weaponry and air power that can make holding urban centres costly for insurgents. Urban control, especially in Yangon and Mandalay, gives the junta leverage that purely territorial gains in borderlands do not immediately remove. Moreover, the resistance camp is not a single monolith. Differences in political objectives, ethnic priorities and governance models between ethnic armed organisations, local PDFs and the National Unity Government could complicate attempts to translate battlefield success into a nationally accepted alternative to military rule. Those constraints mean the junta is vulnerable but not yet decisively finished.
China’s role will be decisive in the near term. Beijing has already acted as a broker of temporary truces and as a pressure point on both sides when border stability and trade are at risk. Beijing’s priorities will be regional stability and protection of cross border economic and security interests rather than promoting regime change. That dynamic suggests China could blunt the alliance’s momentum if Beijing judges that a junta collapse would threaten its interests. The result will likely be a pattern of episodic fighting punctuated by Chinese-mediated pauses.
So what is the most likely strategic trajectory in the coming months? A plausible near to mid term scenario is a persistent and widening stalemate that favours attrition against the military. The junta will try to use air power, focused offensives and selective counterinsurgency to retake key nodes. The alliance and allied PDFs will consolidate control in liberated townships and attempt to build rudimentary governance. International actors will continue to be constrained in direct engagement because of the junta’s diplomatic posture and China’s centrality to talks. Over time the balance will depend on the alliance’s ability to sustain logistics, to reduce internal political friction, and to win over urban and peri urban populations, and on whether external actors elect to underwrite stability for the junta or to press for an inclusive political settlement.
Policy choices matter now. External governments should calibrate responses to avoid accelerating a security vacuum that could produce deeper fragmentation or invite external intervention. Humanitarian response must be scaled to the displacement and protection needs that follow territorial change. Long term resolution will require a political framework that addresses the core grievances of ethnic minority groups, decentralised governance and meaningful security arrangements. Without a credible political alternative to military rule, battlefield gains risk producing fragmented local administration and protracted instability instead of durable peace.
The Three Brotherhood Alliance’s recent gains expose the junta’s vulnerabilities and raise real questions about the durability of military rule in Myanmar. But gains on the battlefield are only the first stage of a much longer transition. The ultimate outcome will be determined as much by politics and diplomacy as by firepower. External actors should prepare for a prolonged transition period and prioritize measures that limit human suffering while supporting an inclusive political process.