The collapse of the G5 Sahel joint force is not an isolated bureaucratic failure. It is the culmination of a political realignment, the withdrawal of external partners, and competing regional projects of security that, taken together, have left a widening security vacuum across the Central Sahel. Understanding that vacuum requires a short accounting of events, a reading of the operational consequences on the ground, and an assessment of the trajectories open to regional and international actors.
What happened. The G5 Sahel was conceived in 2014 as a hybrid security and development framework for Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger, with its joint counterterrorism force stood up in 2017. By late 2023 the institutional project had effectively unraveled: Mali had earlier disengaged and in November 2023 Burkina Faso and Niger announced they were quitting “all instances of the G5 Sahel, including the joint force.” The two remaining members, Chad and Mauritania, moved to implement Article 20 of the founding convention, paving the way to formal dissolution. Those decisions reflected both frustration with the force’s record and a political rejection of the partners who had sustained it.
A new, narrower alignment emerged even as the G5 unraveled. Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso signed a mutual defence charter known as the Alliance of Sahel States in September 2023 and began building bilateral and trilateral security mechanisms outside the G5 or the Economic Community of West African States. That pivot narrowed the field of cooperation and hardened the split between the junta-led interior Sahel and the broader West African institutional order.
Why the timing amplified risk. The institutional collapse occurred at a moment when outside partners were retrenching. The European Union moved to end its long standing military training mission in Mali in May 2024, a decision that formalised the suspension of a key channel of capacity building that had linked regional armies to international standards and to cooperative frameworks that reinforced the G5’s purpose. The EU decision was not the only sign of a withdrawal of Western operational depth. Taken together the political ruptures, expulsions of foreign units and the retrenchment of external training capacity removed reinforcing layers that had, imperfectly, bolstered regional operations.
What the vacuum looks like on the ground. Data compiled through mid 2024 show a sharp rise in violent fatalities and geographic diffusion of jihadi activity across Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. ACLED analysis reported record high fatalities in the first half of 2024 and documented Islamic State-affiliated groups exploiting gaps in contested border areas such as the Liptako-Gourma. Those shifts are consistent with local reporting of expanded militant territorial control, more frequent ambushes and attacks on towns, and the displacement of civilians. In short, the operational space that a coordinated multinational force once aimed to limit has widened.
The humanitarian and protection consequences are already severe. United Nations briefings and humanitarian actors warned in mid 2024 that tens of millions across the Sahel needed life saving assistance and protection. The region hosted millions of internally displaced people and refugees and faced acute funding shortfalls for humanitarians, even as health centers and schools were closing because of insecurity. These are not peripheral effects. A degraded security architecture directly constrains aid delivery and amplifies civilian suffering, which in turn creates recruitment pools for armed groups and further erodes state legitimacy.
The role of new security providers and the operational limits they introduce. As Western partners withdrew or reduced their footprint, new external actors became more visible on the ground in different forms. Russian private military formations were reported operating alongside Malian forces in 2024 and suffered operational losses in July 2024 when convoys and bases came under heavy attack. The presence of these actors has been double edged. Their deployment can change tactical dynamics by providing training, aviation, or battlefield support. At the same time they have not produced a durable reversal of insurgent gains and have contributed to political polarisation and reputational risk for partners inside the region. The result is a patchwork security environment made up of national forces, foreign contractors, and a multiplicity of non state armed actors. That configuration is a poor substitute for a coordinated regional response.
Three strategic consequences to watch.
1) Fragmentation of regional coordination. The G5’s collapse has left no functioning, broadly legitimate, multinational counterterrorism mechanism that spans the Central Sahel. Competing frameworks and the withdrawal of key coastal partners mean intelligence fusion, combined patrols and rapid cross border response are all weakened.
2) Lowered barriers for transnational armed groups. Groups that previously faced interdiction in some border corridors now meet weaker, less coordinated resistance. That increases the risk of territorial control, predatory governance, and the normalization of parallel systems of taxation and dispute resolution that undercut state authority.
3) Worsened humanitarian access with spillover risk. Displacement, food insecurity and the breakdown of health and education services will exert pressure on neighbouring states. That pressure will show up not only in refugee flows but also in cross border crime, illicit commodity flows and contested resource access at precisely the time when regional cooperation is thinner.
Policy implications and practical priorities. Policymakers who care about stabilising the Sahel must face an uncomfortable truth. There is no return to the pre 2020 architecture. The instruments that once underpinned regional counterterrorism are gone or politically poisoned. The question now is not how to revive the G5. It is how to build a credible, plural and accountable security and assistance framework that acknowledges new political realities while shrinking the operational space for violent actors.
Concretely that requires three complementary lines of effort.
1) Rebuild multilateral, non partisan channels for intelligence and logistics. Even if full political reintegration with some governments is not possible, coastal states, the African Union, the United Nations and willing bilateral partners should sustain secure lines for intelligence exchange, humanitarian corridor planning and logistics support that can operate across administrative ruptures.
2) Scale protection sensitive humanitarian outreach. Donors and UN agencies must prioritise predictable, flexible funding for protection, shelter, food and cross border health services. That funding is not merely charity. It is stabilisation. Without it the cycle of displacement and recruitment will intensify.
3) Expand political and civic engagement to undercut armed groups’ local legitimacy. Long term, security without governance will fail. International actors should condition support on verifiable protections for civilians, on steps to restore basic public services, and on concrete timelines for political dialogue wherever feasible. This approach requires patience and granular diplomacy, not blunt military fixes.
Conclusion. The fall of the G5 joint force changed how security will be made in the Sahel. It has removed a shared platform that, despite its limitations, created incentives for joint action. Absent an immediate, credible replacement the result will be more localized contestation, deeper humanitarian needs and a shifting map of external influence. Stabilisation is still possible but it will require realism about political constraints, renewed investment in lifesaving aid, and modular, multilateral operational tools that can function even in a fragmented political environment. The alternative is clear. A protracted vacuum will entrench violent actors and force neighbours and distant partners into ad hoc, costly interventions that make recovery harder and extend suffering for civilians.