India’s next generation Akash missile, known as Akash‑NG, moved from experimental prototype to an exportable proposition in 2024 after a string of high‑profile developmental milestones. The Defence Research and Development Organisation publicly recorded a successful flight test of Akash‑NG on January 12, 2024, a validation that DRDO, the Indian Air Force and Indian defence firms regard as the foundation for subsequent user trials and production scale up.
Technically the Akash‑NG is a significant step up from earlier Akash variants. Public reporting from the January 2024 tests and related technical summaries highlighted a heavier emphasis on a canisterised form factor, an indigenous radio frequency seeker, and a propulsion and airframe architecture that pushes engagement ranges well beyond the 25–30 kilometre envelope of legacy Akash systems. Range figures in public sources clustered in the tens of kilometres beyond earlier variants, while authorities described faster reaction times, multi target engagement capability and greater mobility. Those attributes make Akash‑NG suited to the market niche between short range point defence and high end long range systems.
The timing of Akash‑NG’s maturation matters because India’s defence exports were already growing fast in 2023–24. Indian reporting in late October 2024 noted defence exports for the fiscal year 2023–24 reached roughly Rs 21,083 crore, and that finished systems such as air‑defence batteries were becoming a visible part of New Delhi’s outward facing defence industrial footprint. That export momentum creates both supply chain incentives and political cover for pitching more sophisticated systems abroad.
Put bluntly, Akash‑NG is attractive to potential buyers for three linked reasons. First, it is a domestically produced medium range surface to air missile with modern seekers and canister launchers, so it is relatively plug and play for buyers that lack deep integration experience with Western or Russian systems. Second, price and sovereign political leverage matter. For many middle power militaries the tradeoff is not between Akash‑NG and the most advanced western systems but between Akash‑NG and older Russian or Chinese packages, or no credible medium range air defence at all. Third, India has precedent now for selling missiles abroad. The BrahMos sale to the Philippines in 2022 showed New Delhi can close export contracts for complex missile systems and deliver associated training and logistics. Those precedents reduce buyer risk calculations when considering Akash family systems.
From a structural geopolitics perspective the growing interest in Akash and the developmental progress of Akash‑NG create an amplification effect. States in South Asia, the Caucasus, Southeast Asia and parts of Africa are recalibrating air defence procurement because aerial threats have become more diverse. For India this is a moment to convert technological credibility into diplomatic leverage. Offering integrated packages that include radars, command and control and sustainment builds long term ties that outlast single deliveries. The firms and public sector units that make up India’s Akash ecosystem were visible partners during the January 2024 test, a coordination that signals to buyers a domestic industrial depth behind the product.
There are, however, real constraints and strategic risks. First, production capacity and supply chains need to be hardened before New Delhi can promise rapid follow‑on deliveries to multiple foreign customers. Second, buyers will demand lifecycle support, software updates and integration help for multi platform air‑defence architectures. That requires durable institutional arrangements and financing mechanisms. Third, the export of air‑defence missiles is inherently political because customers may deploy them in sensitive regional disputes and because suppliers must weigh their wider strategic relationships. India will therefore need to balance commercial ambition against diplomatic consequences. These are not technical problems alone but policy choices that shape long term influence.
If policymakers want Akash‑NG to be more than a proof point they should focus on three priorities. Scale production deliberately and transparently so delivery schedules are credible. Build export finance and logistics packages that mirror what competitor suppliers offer. Finally, accept that technology transfer, co‑production and sustained training are not giveaways but the cost of building strategic partnerships. Done well, Akash‑NG can become both an export success and a lever of Indian influence. Done poorly, it will join many capable systems that failed to translate industrial pride into geopolitical presence.
The Akash family’s transition from domestic protector to international commodity is not automatic. The January 12, 2024 flight test established technical credibility. The export momentum reported in October 2024 established commercial opportunity. The next phase is where strategy and industry must converge to convert tested capability into durable diplomatic advantage.