A surprise opposition offensive that pushed into Aleppo and the wider north west of Syria in late November 2024 forced a rapid recalculation in Moscow and Damascus. Fighters led by Hayat Tahrir al Sham and allied Turkish backed factions made unusually rapid territorial gains beginning on November 27, prompting Russian and Syrian warplanes to resume strikes over rebel-held areas in an attempt to blunt the advance and stabilise regime lines.
The immediate facts are stark and unambiguous. The offensive seized dozens of villages and reached the outskirts of Aleppo within days. Russian and Syrian aircraft struck targets in Idlib and Aleppo provinces as regime forces scrambled to hold ground. Monitors and humanitarian agencies reported heavy combat and mounting civilian displacement, with UN agencies saying more than 14,000 people were displaced in the early days of the fighting. Independent monitors attributed dozens of civilian deaths to airstrikes and other bombardment.
Moscow framed its response in conventional diplomatic terms, calling the assault an encroachment on Syrian sovereignty and urging a rapid restoration of order by Damascus. Kremlin spokesmen emphasised Russian support for the Syrian government and Russian statements signalled the resumption of a more active military role, at least from the air.
Strategically this return of air support does three things for the Assad camp. First, it buys time. Airpower gives the regime a higher tempo tool to blunt opposition advances and to interdict rebel logistics on main axes such as the M5 corridor. Second, it reduces the immediacy of a regime collapse in critical northern districts by enabling counter strikes against concentrations of fighters and captured equipment. Third, it reasserts Moscow’s stake in the conflict and in its ability to protect forward basing and access to the Mediterranean. Each of these effects is real. They are, however, also temporary and costly. Continued reliance on airpower to stabilise ground that is politically and militarily fragile risks repeated cycles of escalation with severe humanitarian costs.
There are technological and operational dynamics at work that shape both options and risks. The offensive and the response demonstrated the continuing centrality of precision and non precision air strikes, manned strike sorties launched from facilities such as Hmeimim, and the growing tactical use of drones and loitering munitions across the Syrian battlefield. Opposition forces used massed ground assaults combined with drones and explosive vehicles to achieve surprise and tempo. Regime and Russian forces reverted to air strikes to compensate for deficiencies in manpower and territorial control. The result is a battlespace where cheap unmanned systems and contested information flows enable rapid shock operations, while high end airpower remains the regime backstop.
Regionally the return of Russian air support raises immediate political problems. Ankara publicly demanded an end to strikes on rebel held Idlib and warned against further destabilisation near its border, making Turkish deconfliction and diplomacy an active part of the crisis management equation. Tehran likewise pledged backing for Damascus, underscoring that any renewed fighting will draw in the network of Iranian proxys and advisers that have supported the regime for years. That combination complicates Moscow’s calculations. Russia can provide sorties and munitions, but it cannot easily substitute for the political and human resources needed to reconstitute a sustainable, locally accepted security architecture across contested governorates.
The political arithmetic is sobering. By reintroducing significant air support Moscow signals that it will not abandon its bases and influence in western Syria. At the same time, a reliance on aerial suppression to prop up vulnerable ground forces is both expensive and liable to produce international backlash when civilian harm is evident. The SOHR casualty figures and UN displacement estimates from late November underline that risk. Continued air campaigns will make humanitarian response more difficult and will sharpen frictions with regional actors like Turkey and with Western governments that monitor civilian protection closely.
What should observers watch for next. First, does Russia sustain high sortie rates or limit operations to targeted interdiction aimed solely at the most immediate rebel concentrations. Sustained high intensity air support would indicate a longer term commitment with commensurate political costs. Second, will Turkey move from diplomatic protest to tighter border controls or selective support to factions it deems critical to its own security interests. Third, whether Iran increases its low visibility advisory and militia footprint to compensate for Russian limits on ground force deployment. Finally, the humanitarian signal will matter: rising civilian casualties will increase international pressure for de escalation and for mechanisms to protect civilians and enable aid.
In the medium term the episode is a reminder that airpower can stabilise a collapsing front but cannot create a durable political settlement on its own. Moscow’s return to the skies buys Damascus breathing room. The broader question is whether that breathing room will be used to pursue a credible political compact or only to defer an inevitably costly and recurrent security problem. For external actors the calculus is similar. Pushing actors to invest in local governance, humanitarian protection and credible ceasefire mechanisms matters more than ever. Absent those, the pattern of local breakthroughs, followed by air supported counter attacks, followed by renewed cycles of displacement and instability will repeat. The technology of war has changed. The political strategies available to end Syria’s conflict have not.