China’s public roadmap for an International Lunar Research Station reframes competition on and around the Moon from episodic prestige missions into a long term program for presence and infrastructure. Officials have described the ILRS as a modular system with surface, orbital and Earth segments, intended to be built in phases with a “basic” surface station by the mid 2030s and an expanded network thereafter. The proposal encompasses power systems, communications and navigation networks, Earth-moon transport links, and in-situ resource use experiments, and it explicitly invites international partners at multiple tiers.

Those are not abstract ambitions. Recent Chinese missions and supporting architecture show the effort moving from concept to capability. China launched the Queqiao-2 relay satellite in March 2024 to provide long duration communications and relay services for far side and polar missions. The Chang’e series has already achieved sample return from high-value lunar targets in 2024 and China has scheduled Chang’e-7 and Chang’e-8 as demonstrators for south pole prospecting and resource use that will feed into ILRS construction. These mission and infrastructure pieces materially lower the cost and risk of sustained operations on the Moon.

China has framed ILRS as an international initiative that it will develop jointly with partners. The China-Russia roadmap published in earlier cooperative statements and subsequent outreach documents make clear that Beijing and Moscow intend to position the ILRS as a multilateral alternative to other lunar governance arrangements. That diplomatic positioning is itself a strategic instrument: it offers partners access to operational lunar infrastructure while reshaping the normative architecture for resource access and operations on the Moon.

From a security perspective the ILRS has three immediate implications. First, the construction of on-site energy, communications and transportation networks converts episodic missions into persistent presence. Persistent presence matters because it changes operational calculus. Assets that are dual use in nature can be repurposed, or perceived to be repurposed, from scientific support to command, control and situational awareness nodes. Long range relay satellites, precision landing and surface mobility systems enable sustained logistics and human rotations, which in turn create options for rapid reinforcement or denial. The recent Queqiao-2 deployment and the stated architecture for ILRS illustrate how such enabling capabilities are already being layered in.

Second, the technical choices baked into a lunar base carry downstream security consequences. ILRS descriptions reference solar arrays, radioisotope sources and even nuclear generators as part of a diversified power portfolio for long duration operations. Power systems, surface transport corridors and docking hubs are inherently dual use because they support both civilian research and any future human missions with strategic value. Building this infrastructure on the lunar south pole or in orbit will raise questions about defensive measures, redundancy, and the protection of high value assets. The UN treaty framework prohibits weapons of mass destruction in space, but it does not eliminate ambiguity around non-WMD dual use systems, nor does it prescribe governance for ground based resource extraction or commercial operations.

Third, ILRS diplomacy exacerbates governance fragmentation. Since the Artemis Accords and the U.S.-led coalition established one set of procedural norms for lunar activities, an alternative platform led by different major powers risks creating parallel practices and technical standards. The result could be competing regimes for data sharing, safety zones, resource extraction rules and commercial access. Where rules diverge, misperception and miscalculation become more likely, and routine operations risk conflict through accident or contested interpretations of rights and responsibilities. The continuing constraints on U.S.-China bilateral cooperation, including legislative limits that shaped NASA policy for more than a decade, further complicate confidence building. Recent exchanges over lunar samples show that limited scientific engagement can still occur, but structural barriers remain to deeper operational coordination with China.

Taken together these dynamics point to four pragmatic policy priorities for states and multilateral institutions that care about keeping the Moon peaceful and usable. First, establish transparent notification and deconfliction channels that are operational well before routine crewed rotations begin. Technical transparency about key infrastructure locations, power plants and long range communications assets reduces ambiguity. Second, negotiate and codify operational safety standards that go beyond broad treaty language to address proximity operations, rendezvous rules and orbital traffic management in cislunar space. Third, invest in multilateral scientific confidence building measures, for example independent inspection protocols, sample sharing frameworks and joint environmental monitoring, that create lower risk pathways for cooperation even when broader political relations are strained. Fourth, develop an agreed approach to resource use and environmental protection that reconciles Article I and Article II of the Outer Space Treaty with realistic plans for in-situ resource utilization, including the creation of mechanisms to adjudicate disputes.

The long view matters. Hardware delivered to the Moon in the 2020s and 2030s will shape the operational landscape for decades. That is why the ILRS is not merely a program for Chinese prestige or scientific leadership. It is an infrastructure project with strategic effects. Policymakers should treat it as such: accept that competition over lunar governance is now an institutional front line, while also using pragmatic, narrow confidence building steps to prevent competition from hardening into confrontation. In the absence of inclusive, credible governance, the Moon risks becoming another domain where strategic rivalry drives outcomes that are neither scientifically optimal nor strategically stabilizing.