When states try to convert trade dependence into political leverage they rely on two levers. The first is the immediate ability to withhold physical supplies. The second is the expectation that buyers will be unable or unwilling to find alternatives quickly. Over the past two years the European Union has methodically weakened both levers, and the result is that Moscow’s once potent gas weapon is far less effective than it was on the eve of the 2022 invasion.
Brussels began by addressing the second, more durable vulnerability. Through REPowerEU and a suite of emergency measures the EU forced a structural shift in demand and resilience. Collective consumption fell significantly as energy saving and efficiency measures took hold. More importantly for crisis resilience, member states prioritised filling underground storage and reached exceptionally high stock levels ahead of the 2024/25 winter, providing a buffer that directly reduces the coercive value of short term supply interruptions.
At the same time the market adjusted. European buyers and traders rerouted volumes, expanded LNG import capacity and created new logistical patterns that blunt the leverage of pipeline chokepoints. Where pipeline flows were throttled or lost, liquefied natural gas stepped in. Independent analyses and port-level data show that a material fraction of volumes previously carried by pipelines has been substituted with seaborne deliveries. That substitution is messy and costly, and it has environmental costs, but from the perspective of geopolitical resilience it is decisive.
Russia reacted by promoting seaborne sales and discounted cargoes. That has complicated the political calculus in Europe because sanctions on seaborne gas are legally and politically harder to impose than those on crude oil. The upshot is paradoxical. Europe has reduced reliance on Russian pipeline gas, yet in the short run discounted Russian LNG has found buyers, transit hubs and reexport pathways inside the EU. This phenomenon has created awkward policy tradeoffs for capitals trying to balance security, markets and contract law.
The macroeconomic impact on Moscow and its flagship exporter has been non trivial. Gazprom’s accounts and market performance in 2023 reflected a sharp fall in European sales. The corporation recorded large losses and sharply lower core profits as traditional markets shrank and revenues evaporated. That financial damage matters because it constrains Russia’s ability to use price or quantity as a recurring geopolitical lever without inflicting significant cost on its own balance sheet.
The political symbolism of the pipeline era is also waning. By late 2024 Russian leadership publicly acknowledged the diminishing prospects of maintaining prewar transit patterns to Europe. Statements from the Kremlin signalled an acceptance that old arteries of influence would not reconstitute in the near term. That acceptance reflects both the markets that have adjusted and the strategic choices by European capitals to accelerate diversification.
This is not to say the problem is solved. Fragmentation within the EU leaves differential exposure. Some member states remain more dependent on Russian-sourced molecules in the near term. Legal entanglements in long term contracts, the persistence of discounted cargoes and the continuing ability to route gas through alternate pipelines or tankers mean that energy remains a bargaining chip, albeit a blunted one. The EU’s task is therefore to convert short term resilience into long term structural separation from a supplier whose strategic interests are hostile to the bloc.
Policy options to complete that transition are familiar. They include continued investment in interconnectors and storage, accelerated deployment of renewables and electrification to reduce gas demand in industry and heating, coordinated joint purchases to stabilise markets, and carefully designed legal instruments to prevent circumvention of import restrictions without provoking costly litigation for private buyers. The EU has already moved on several of these fronts, which explains why the energy weapon now performs inconsistently at best.
For Moscow the strategic calculus has changed. The European market that once underwrote leverage has narrowed, and replacing lost revenues requires time, investment and access to new long distance markets. Pivot strategies toward Asia and higher seaborne sales mitigate the loss but do not replicate the integrated, just-in-time pipelines that delivered both revenue and leverage to Russia for decades.
The longer term implication is a partial deweaponisation of natural gas as a ready political instrument against the EU. Energy will remain a strategic asset for Russia, but its unilateral potency has been reduced by a combination of policy, market adaptation and investment decisions inside the EU. For policymakers in Brussels and member states the challenge now is to institutionalise the gains of 2022 to 2024 so that volatility and tactical pressure do not reintroduce strategic dependencies in future decades.