The November 2024 cessation of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah created an opening for diplomacy but it also laid bare how fragile any pause in fighting will be without a credible verification architecture on the ground. The agreement negotiated with heavy U.S. involvement aimed to halt cross border strikes, set conditions for Israeli withdrawal south of the Blue Line and envision expanded Lebanese state presence in the south, all in the shadow of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701.
For UNIFIL the ceasefire represents both an opportunity and a test. The mission was designed to support implementation of UNSCR 1701 and to act as a buffer between Lebanon and Israel, but it was never given the authority to disarm militias or police state sovereignty single handedly. UNIFIL can monitor, report and liaise; it can use force in narrowly defined circumstances such as self defence and to protect civilians. Those limits become decisive when parties expect the mission to provide the kind of intrusive verification that a durable settlement requires.
Operational realities on the ground amplified those legal and political limits throughout late 2024. UNIFIL positions and patrols were repeatedly affected by exchanges of fire, with bases damaged and peacekeepers injured during October and November. The mission reported multiple incidents in which its convoys and positions came under fire or were impacted by nearby strikes, and it repeatedly warned of the constraints fighting placed on its ability to implement its mandate safely. Those episodes forced tactical withdrawals at times and imposed operational restrictions that degraded routine patrolling and monitoring along the Blue Line.
A ceasefire can be written on paper in relative haste. Making it verifiable takes time and resources. Key provisions of the November arrangement expected the Lebanese state to expand the Lebanese Armed Forces presence south of the Litani and to prevent non state actors from operating in certain zones. This creates an immediate verification problem for UNIFIL. The mission must rely heavily on liaison with the LAF, on local access, and on timely, credible reporting to the Security Council. Yet the LAF has political and logistical limitations, while UNIFIL cannot substitute for state authority on questions of weapons control and law enforcement. The result is a verification gap that can be exploited by spoilers or by those who seek to reconstitute capabilities quietly.
That gap has strategic consequences. Western intelligence assessments in late 2024 concluded that Hezbollah had been militarily degraded by sustained Israeli operations but that it would likely attempt to rebuild through recruitment, domestic production and external supply lines. If arms flows or underground infrastructure reemerge, UNIFIL will face acute difficulty in detecting and preventing them without enhanced technical means, better access and stronger coordination with Lebanese authorities and third party monitors. The risk is cyclical. Weak verification invites rearmament. Rearmament prompts Israeli countermeasures. Countermeasures increase military friction that again restricts UNIFIL activity.
Practical impediments compounded political ones during the negotiation phase and after the deal took effect. Mediators, primarily the United States with regional partners and allied European diplomacy, advanced the framework and shuttled between capitals to narrow gaps. Those diplomatic efforts produced the ceasefire window. Yet they also underscored that a political deal depends on credible implementation mechanisms in the field. Without an agreed tripartite mechanism for incident investigation, rapid deconfliction, and an independent verification capacity, the diplomacy will be vulnerable to erosion. UNIFIL sits at the center of that challenge but it cannot shoulder implementation alone.
A further stressor has been safety and freedom of movement. UN briefings documented thousands of projectiles and repeated violations of Lebanese airspace during the escalation, and they noted occasions when logistics convoys faced restrictions by Israeli forces. Those patterns matter because consistent monitoring of the Blue Line, of movements south of it, and of airspace are prerequisites for credible reporting. When peacekeepers cannot patrol or when positions are damaged by nearby strikes, the mission loses both information and deterrent effect. That matters to capitals that need verified data to judge compliance and to calibrate political support.
If the international community wants a lasting settlement, it must invest in three linked areas. First, verification architecture. That means giving UNIFIL enhanced technical tools, clearer rules of engagement for interdiction when justified, and a transparent incident investigation mechanism backed by guarantors. Second, LAF capacity building and political support to ensure the Lebanese state can assume the responsibilities envisioned by the ceasefire. Third, disruption of external supply lines that would allow military regeneration outside Lebanese political control. Each of these elements is necessary to close the verification gap that currently threatens the ceasefire.
None of these steps is easy. Enhanced UN technical capabilities and more intrusive monitoring will raise sovereignty concerns inside Lebanon and legitimate questions about the mission s impartiality. Building LAF capacity requires not only equipment but sustainable political backing and legal authorities. Curtailing external supply channels will depend on regional cooperation that has historically been uneven at best. Yet the alternative is a return to kinetic escalation that will again put UNIFIL in the untenable position of trying to keep the peace while having neither the authority nor the means to prevent its collapse.
For policymakers the takeaway should be sober and strategic. The ceasefire opened a door. Holding it requires deliberately matching diplomatic language to field capabilities. UNIFIL can play a central role but only if the mission s mandate, equipment, and freedom of movement are calibrated to the political commitments that mediators have secured. Otherwise the mission will continue to absorb the costs of conflict containment without ever being empowered to deliver the verification and deterrence necessary for durable stability.