North Korea’s recent artillery moves are not incremental upgrades. They represent a deliberate effort to reshape the peninsula’s conventional strike architecture by extending both reach and flexibility. Over the past year open source reporting and allied intelligence assessments indicate that Pyongyang has accelerated production of long-range guns and rockets, tested larger-caliber systems in salvo, and exported a portion of that inventory to testbeds abroad. These developments matter because they change the geometry of deterrence around Seoul and force a long-term recalibration of allied defense planning.
Two types of systems define the risk profile. First, legacy but long-range tube artillery such as the 170 mm Koksan self-propelled gun remains relevant because, with rocket-assisted projectiles, it can reach deep into the Seoul metropolitan area. Second, the so-called “super-large” rocket artillery family blurs the line between multiple launch rocket systems and short-range ballistic missiles. The 600 mm KN-25 in particular has demonstrated very long reach in tests and is treated by analysts as a quasi-ballistic system with a reach measured in the hundreds of kilometers. That combination of range and salvo mass is why planners in Seoul and Washington talk about “greater Seoul” being squarely in Pyongyang’s targeting envelope.
The operational implications are twofold. One, long-range tube guns and large-caliber MLRS offer the capacity to conduct high-volume, area-saturation fires that degrade civil infrastructure and complicate mass-mobilization and sustainment inside the ROK. Two, quasi-ballistic rocket artillery creates a threat set that is harder for legacy point defenses to defeat because these weapons combine high terminal velocity with massed launches that can saturate interceptors. Recent tests in which large-caliber launchers were used in extended-range salvo have reinforced concerns about both accuracy improvements and the ability to conduct concentrated strikes from depth.
Pyongyang’s decision to move some systems and large quantities of munitions abroad to field situations has amplified the security externalities. Open reporting and allied briefings documented shipments of Koksan guns and multiple-launch rocket systems abroad and large containerized flows of artillery ammunition. Those transfers serve two useful functions for the DPRK. They monetize stockpiles and provide live combat data on munition performance and maintenance requirements. For Seoul and its partners the consequence is a faster learning curve for weapons that were once largely theoretical threats on paper.
Concerns about quantity are not abstract. ROK assessments disclosed to parliament have placed the number of long-range artillery pieces shipped or earmarked for shipment in the hundreds, while open source analysts estimate millions of artillery rounds have moved in container flows. Even if a share of that equipment is older or of uneven quality, volume matters in a theater defined by mass fires and constrained interceptor inventories. The asymmetric logic is simple. If an adversary can impose sustained salvo rates against key nodes, then the marginal utility of top-tier interceptors declines.
Seoul and Washington have already adjusted posture in response. Seoul has resumed high-profile artillery exercises near the border to revalidate counter-battery procedures and to signal readiness to deter massed fires. But exercises and signaling only address readiness. The structural problem is harder: how to tie a layered, resilient defensive architecture to a surge in enemy salvo capacity without triggering uncontrollable escalation. Short-term measures must be complemented by mid-term investments in detection, counter-battery fires, munitions stockpiles, hardened infrastructure, and decentralized continuity plans.
Longer term the modernization trend pushes three policy imperatives. First, islands of vulnerability in the Seoul area and critical nodes across the peninsula require rapid hardening and dispersal planning to reduce single point failure risks. Second, the alliance needs a calibrated mix of active defenses, resilient logistics, and offensive counter-battery options that are sustainable in a prolonged high-intensity fires environment. Third, arms transfer interdiction and diplomatic pressure on states that enable battlefield testing of DPRK systems should be pursued with renewed focus. Pyongyang’s use of foreign battlefields as extended test ranges accelerates its learning curve and undermines arms control norms.
A final, strategic note on escalation. Artillery modernization is not a stand-alone issue. It is embedded in a broader DPRK doctrine that increasingly integrates conventional long-range fires with missile and nuclear signaling. That integration lowers the threshold at which an adversary might need to respond, because conventional strikes can be used to shape a crisis before decisions about nuclear forces are taken. Policymakers who seek to stabilize the peninsula must therefore treat long-range artillery as both a present tactical threat and a multiplier of strategic risk. The practical corollary is that investments in defensive depth are also investments in crisis stability.