As of July 24, 2025, the question of Saudi re-engagement in Yemen must be read through three overlapping prisms: the shock of the March–May 2025 air campaign led by the United States and partners, the short ceasefire brokered in early May, and Riyadh’s longstanding strategic constraints and political calculations. The March offensive inflicted material damage on Houthi capabilities and caused widely reported civilian harm, but it did not produce a decisive political outcome that would suddenly make a Saudi return to large scale aerial operations inevitable.
Operationally, the most salient fact is that the major kinetic pressure in spring 2025 was American and allied, not Saudi. Washington launched a high tempo campaign from mid March and then announced a halt after an Oman-mediated understanding with Houthi leaders on May 6, 2025. That ceasefire explicitly covered U.S. strikes and Houthi attacks on U.S. vessels in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb. Riyadh was kept informed of negotiations, but the May settlement did not amount to a Saudi-led resumption of an independent, kingdom-scale air campaign.
Why Riyadh is constrained from reviving a broad air campaign is predictable. Saudi planners remember the costs of the 2015–2022 intervention: protracted attrition, international criticism over civilian harm, and the danger that stepped-up strikes would invite asymmetric Houthi retaliation against Saudi infrastructure and shipping. Independent analysts and regional think tanks continued through 2025 to assess that the kingdom remained reluctant to re-enter a major kinetic phase that would risk direct attacks on its own territory and further degrade Gulf stability. Those strategic inhibitors matter as much as battlefield calculations.
At the same time, drivers exist that could push Riyadh back toward strikes on Houthi targets. These include a resumption of Houthi attacks on vessels transiting the Red Sea or on Saudi soil, credible intelligence of new high-end weapon transfers to the Houthis, and acute pressure from Gulf partners and Western allies invested in maritime security. The United Nations panel and other monitors continued to document arms flows and illicit transfers into Yemen in mid 2025, a fact that not only sustains the argument for kinetic responses but also complicates the legal and diplomatic calculus Riyadh would have to manage before authorising strikes.
If Riyadh chose to re-escalate with a renewed air campaign the probable near-term outcomes are clear. First, limited Saudi strikes could degrade specific Houthi launch nodes but would not easily neutralise a dispersed, low-cost drone and missile enterprise. Second, retaliation cycles would likely extend beyond Yemen to attacks on Gulf infrastructure and shipping, raising insurance and commercial disruption costs across the region. Third, a new Saudi campaign risks widening fractures within the anti-Houthi camp, especially given diverging UAE and Saudi priorities in southern Yemen and the persistent influence of local militias. Strategic gains from a Saudi-only air push would therefore be incremental while political and humanitarian costs would be immediate and visible.
What to watch for in the coming months as indicators of Riyadh’s intent: public statements from the Saudi defense ministry or coalition spokespeople that go beyond rhetorical warnings; verified interdictions or imagery showing new high-end arms deliveries into Houthi-controlled areas; a reappearance of coalition or Saudi aircraft over Houthi regions in patterns consistent with strike rather than patrol; and diplomatic signals from Washington, London, or Gulf capitals that they would tacitly support or directly join any Saudi kinetic initiative. Absent those indicators, the default assumption should be continued restraint by Riyadh, with kinetic pressure remaining episodic and largely shaped by external actors.
Policy implication for outside parties and regional stakeholders is straightforward. Pushing Riyadh toward renewed kinetic action by framing the choice solely as a security imperative ignores the kingdom’s political sensitivities and the asymmetric risk calculus created by Houthi capabilities. Practical alternatives that deserve more emphasis include strengthening maritime defenses, investing in interdiction and legal mechanisms to block illicit arms flows, and revitalising a credible negotiated track that links maritime de-escalation to a measured political process for Yemen. Those approaches are politically harder but strategically less likely to produce a spiralling cycle of strikes and reprisals that would deepen the humanitarian catastrophe and regional instability.
In short, as of July 24, 2025, a full scale Saudi air campaign revival is neither the most probable nor the most effective immediate path. It remains an option in Riyadh’s toolkit if red lines are crossed. But current evidence points to a preference for calibrated responses, diplomatic pressure, and reliance on partner-led kinetic options rather than a wholesale Saudi re-entry into prolonged aerial warfare over Yemen. The more consequential battle for influence in Yemen will be fought in the political and economic arenas, not only in the skies.