The pause negotiated between Washington and Sana’a in early May looked, at first glance, like a narrow tactical success. Oman publicly said it had brokered an arrangement under which the Houthis would not target American vessels and the United States would halt strikes in response. The announcement reduced immediate confrontations between US forces and Houthi units, but the agreement was explicitly circumscribed; Houthi leaders made clear the pause did not extend to actions against Israel or Israel-linked maritime traffic.

That limited scope has proven to be the truce’s structural weakness. By July, Houthi operations in the Red Sea had reemerged with lethal effect. In a matter of days the group struck and sank at least two commercial bulk carriers after sustained multi-vector assaults that combined unmanned aerial vehicles, explosive-laden surface drones, and swarming small-boat attacks. Dozens of crew were put at risk, several sailors were killed, and surviving seafarers were taken into Houthi custody in some cases. The way those incidents were executed underlined a marked shift from opportunistic harassment to deliberate, combined-arms attacks against merchant shipping.

Independent monitors and the UN system have tracked a clear intensification in both volume and sophistication of Houthi strikes across the period from August 2024 through July 2025. The Security Council and expert panels have repeatedly highlighted the expanding use of advanced unmanned systems and sea drones, and they have warned that continuing flows of materiel and technical assistance are sustaining that capacity. These findings matter because they show the resurgence is not merely episodic. It is the product of an adaptable campaign using commercially available components, indigenous improvisation, and external supply chains.

From a tactical and operational point of view, the redeployment of drones and unmanned surface vessels (USVs) is significant for four reasons. First, drones lower the cost of attack and raise the tempo of operations, enabling longer reach and persistent harassment without exposing Houthi personnel to direct counterattack. Second, coupling aerial drones with explosive USVs and armed skiffs creates layered attack profiles that defeat single-mode defenses on many merchant ships. Third, the use of commercially sourced components and modular designs complicates attribution and interdiction. Fourth, these tactics exploit legal and rules-of-engagement gaps that navies struggle to close without risking escalation with the group and with its external backers. Reporting from the July incidents made all of these dynamics visible.

The truce’s unraveling in practice exposes three strategic dilemmas for Washington and its partners. The first is deterrence credibility. A truce that leaves a principal Houthi objective untouched is unlikely to restrain the movement when it judges political conditions elsewhere to be compelling. The second is escalation management. US restraint toward Houthi targets in exchange for a limited promise created room for the Houthis to reallocate resources toward the anti-Israel campaign and to test thresholds that risk wider regional responses. The third is maritime governance. International shipping, insurers, and flag states now face the hard choice between commercially costly rerouting and accepting higher premiums and convoy-like security measures in a narrow chokepoint that is vital to global trade. UN and multilateral reporting in mid‑2025 already reflected those frictions.

Policy responses must therefore be calibrated across three tracks. Operationally, naval coalitions need to invest in integrated counters to combined unmanned attacks. That means pairing more capable surface and airborne sensors with rules and assets that can interdict USVs and swarms before they reach merchant hulls. Diplomatically, the United States should push for a genuinely comprehensive cessation that covers all shipping in international waters and addresses the underlying drivers of Houthi escalation. Practically, port authorities and commercial operators must harden routing protocols, improve vetting procedures for vessels with Israeli connections, and work with insurers and flag states to reduce incentives for risky port calls while safeguarding seafarer welfare. Evidence from the July attacks shows that without coordinated civil, military, and diplomatic measures the operational gains of a pause will be short lived.

Beyond immediate measures, there is a longer term lesson about the diffusion of unmanned weapons. The Red Sea episodes demonstrate how cheap, modular, and partly commodity-based systems can shift the balance between state and non-state actors. If the Houthis continue to refine their maritime drone doctrine, the strategic environment in key chokepoints will change permanently. That demands a policy mix that combines interdiction of supply chains, targeted sanctions enforcement, and investment in resilient sea-lane architecture. If those wider changes are not addressed, temporary tactical pauses will keep being undercut by tactical innovation, with cascading costs for commerce, regional stability, and the humanitarian situation in Yemen.

Policy makers should therefore treat the May pause as what it was: a fragile emissary of de-escalation, not a solution. The July attacks made that distinction painfully clear. Without a broader political settlement and a tighter multilateral effort to choke off the networks enabling unmanned systems, the Red Sea will remain a theater where single-purpose truces are quickly outflanked by technological adaptation and geopolitical incentives.