Rebuilding Gaza is not primarily a construction problem. It is a political and security challenge in which local leverage, external conditionality, and competing visions of governance interact to determine who actually controls the rubble and who benefits from the recovery. Since the 2023–2024 escalation, international actors have regularly said reconstruction is essential. At the same time they insist that Hamas cannot be allowed to return to power, a condition that creates a paradox: donors need access and a degree of local cooperation to rebuild, but the only entity with the territorial presence and networks to provide that cooperation is the same one many donors want sidelined.
The phrase veto power is useful because it captures two distinct mechanisms by which Hamas can shape outcomes. The first mechanism is practical and administrative. On the ground Hamas maintains the institutions, personnel, and territorial control that make reconstruction logistically possible or impossible. Reuters and other reporting in 2025 documented Hamas officials overseeing rubble clearance, policing corridors, and protecting aid convoys, signaling continued dominance of everyday governance even after major combat operations. That control translates into the ability to delay permits, influence who is hired, redirect supplies, and, in extremis, block work entirely. In short, whoever controls local checkpoints, clearing teams, and supply chains can exercise a near absolute operational veto over reconstruction timelines.
The second mechanism is political. Key states and international institutions have conditioned reconstruction funding on the exclusion or demilitarization of Hamas. European governments and several Arab capitals publicly supported Arab- and UN-backed plans that sought to restore the Palestinian Authority or install technocratic administrations as a way to keep Hamas at arm’s length. At the same time Israel and major Western donors have insisted that any durable reconstruction plan deliver security guarantees and ensure Hamas does not reconstitute its military capability. Those demands mean that reconstruction becomes a bargaining chip in wider negotiations over disarmament, hostages, and governance. When political leverage is linked to material relief, the armed actor in control of the territory gains bargaining power equivalent to a veto.
Donor design choices so far have amplified this dynamic. Regional and international donors propose trust funds, donor conferences, and third party implementation to avoid direct contact with Hamas while still delivering for civilians. Egypt, Qatar and other regional actors have advanced competing plans for trustee arrangements and technical committees to channel money and projects. Qatar’s longstanding role funding reconstruction projects and operating committees inside Gaza illustrates how external finance can be both a lifeline for civilians and a source of leverage for local actors who steward deliveries. The historical reality is that bypassing an entrenched local authority without creating a viable, legitimate alternative tends to produce either hollow administrative arrangements or pragmatic accommodations that leave the local actor in a position to block or shape projects.
Security controls compound the problem. Israel’s insistence on strict lists of dual use goods and its control of key crossings means that even donor-funded projects require Israeli approvals to obtain materials such as cement, rebar, and generators. That creates additional choke points where political demands can translate into delays or denials. Likewise, donors’ legitimate insistence on preventing diversion of funds to armed groups generates monitoring requirements that are technically demanding in an environment of broken institutions and damaged infrastructure. Those practical restrictions give both external and local security actors leverage to shape the reconstruction agenda.
What does this mean for policy? First, any realistic reconstruction architecture must acknowledge the asymmetric sources of veto power and plan around them. The illusion that donors can simply exclude Hamas wholesale and build using only international contractors and remote oversight is likely to produce failure or long delays. Donors must confront three linked facts. One, local actors who control territory will be able to frustrate projects unless they are meaningfully included or neutralized by credible alternatives. Two, security guarantees and supply chain access are political instruments that will condition the pace and form of reconstruction. Three, rushed settlements that do not resolve governance and accountability will store up future risk for renewed conflict.
Second, risk management should be operationalized through phased, conditional approaches calibrated to on the ground verification. Phases should sequence immediate lifesaving repairs and critical services under tight monitoring and transparency provisions, followed by reconstruction of housing and infrastructure tied to verified commitments on demilitarization, civilian governance, and inclusive political processes. Donor trust funds and multilateral implementation can help, but they must be paired with field-level mechanisms that reduce single points of failure. That may include international technical teams working alongside vetted local civil servants, rigorous independent auditing of procurement, and robust community engagement to reduce incentives for diversion.
Third, international actors must restore credible, locally legitimate governance alternatives. The Palestinian Authority has international legitimacy in the eyes of many donors but lacks operational presence and popular support in Gaza. Efforts to import a governance structure without roots will either be symbolic or require force to sustain. A more durable approach is to combine capacity building for local civil institutions, transparent recruitment of municipal staff, and a clear roadmap for democratic accountability so that any interim administration enjoys declining dependence on external military guarantees.
Fourth, security solutions must be regional and not merely domestic. Israel seeks guarantees that reduce cross border threats. Neighboring states and international guarantors will need to be part of any demilitarization and monitoring regime. That may include neutral international observers, demilitarized border architectures with layered inspections, and explicit timelines and benchmarks aligned to reconstruction tranches. These arrangements are politically difficult, but absent regional buy in reconstruction funding will be hostage to political swings.
Finally, technology can help but cannot substitute for political settlement. Digital procurement systems, biometric registrations for cash assistance, satellite imagery and open contracting platforms improve transparency and reduce leakage. At the same time those tools require functioning institutions, training, and citizen trust. Tech is an accelerator of existing capabilities. It will widen the gap between well governed projects and those lacking oversight, but it will not resolve the underlying political veto without accompanying governance measures.
The bottom line is blunt. If donors and states insist on removing Hamas from power as a precondition for funding but do not provide an operational alternative that delivers security and services on the ground, Gaza’s reconstruction will stall. That stall will be enforced by the very actors donors seek to exclude. The challenge for policymakers is to craft an architecture that reduces perverse leverage, protects civilians, and sequences political and security arrangements so reconstruction is neither hostage to maximalist demands nor a vehicle for entrenching an unsustainable political order. Achieving that balance will be slow and politically costly, but it is the only way to convert billions in pledges into durable reconstruction rather than a temporary patchwork that preserves the conditions for the next conflict.