Naypyidaw has moved from symbolic fortress to contested airspace. The April 2024 wave of improvised kamikaze drones that the opposition said struck the military headquarters, the Aye Lar airbase and even the residence of the junta chief proved that resistance forces can reach the regime’s nerve center.

That strike was not an isolated publicity stunt. It was the logical next step in a conflict where low-cost unmanned systems have become mass produced, battle tested and tactically decisive for nonstate actors. Groups like the Kloud Team and affiliated PDF units have shown they can assemble swarms of fixed wing and rotary platforms, tune them to carry explosive ordnance and coordinate attacks over dozens of kilometres.

But the air balance in 2025 is not what it was in 2022 or 2023. Independent monitoring and field interviews show a fast rising countertrend: the junta has been investing in more capable drones, night vision and infrared payloads, and in electronic warfare measures that blunt insurgent advantages. Analysts at ACLED and other observers describe 2025 as the year the military began to close the technological gap.

Two linked dynamics make the current proximity of rebel drones to Naypyidaw especially consequential. First, improved offensive capability among some resistance units raises the probability of further strikes on high value military or logistical targets inside the capital, even if many attempts are detected or intercepted. Such attacks erode the junta’s claim of invulnerability and alter political calculations at home and abroad.

Second, the junta’s response is not limited to intercepting airframes. It is building layered countermeasures: fielded jammers, upgraded air defences, procurement of more advanced unmanned systems and reportedly foreign-sourced night vision and infrared cameras that enable effective night operations. These investments raise the bar for rebel operations but also create pressure to escalate tactics, for example by lengthening launch ranges, diversifying frequencies, or attempting stand-off strikes that are harder to disrupt.

Strategically this interaction generates three near-term risks. One, a security dilemma in which each side’s defensive upgrades justify further offensive adaptations by the other, producing a drone arms race that accelerates lethality across Myanmar. Two, increased risk to civilian infrastructure and lives. Drones flown near the capital or against military bases embedded in urban settings raise the chance of erroneous strikes, misfires and collateral damage. Three, regional spillover. As both sides seek parts, sensors and training, neighbouring states and suppliers can become enmeshed, complicating diplomacy and sanctions enforcement.

For international and regional actors the policy calculus must shift from rhetorical condemnation to practical mitigation. First, support for independent monitoring that documents strike patterns and attribution can reduce strategic ambiguity and inform measured responses. Second, assistance focused on counter unmanned aerial systems should prioritise nonlethal and deconfliction measures for civilian airports and infrastructure near conflict zones. Third, diplomatic pressure and export controls targeted at dual use components should be implemented with awareness that black markets and adaptable supply chains will seek workarounds. ACLED’s field reporting highlights how parts, not whole platforms, are often the critical bottleneck.

For the resistance, the tactical value of drones cannot be understated. They remain a force equaliser and a political signal. For the junta, the imperative to protect command nodes inside Naypyidaw will push it toward more aggressive air defence postures and deeper procurement relationships with external partners. Both consequences make a negotiated deescalation harder to achieve but also more necessary for civilian protection.

In practical terms planners and analysts should expect persistent drone activity near Naypyidaw, punctuated by episodic strikes and countermeasures. The most effective path to reducing the hazard is political. Without an inclusive settlement or a credible international process that reduces incentives for direct strikes on the capital, the contest over Myanmar’s skies will continue to recalibrate the broader conflict, driving innovation in improvised weapons while increasing the toll on civilians and the region.