The renewed Houthi push around Marib is more than a localized contest for territory. It is a strategic inflection point for the wider Saudi Arabian security calculus and for regional stability. Marib sits atop Yemen’s last significant concentrations of oil and gas infrastructure under government control, and its capture would not only reshape domestic bargaining power inside Yemen but also alter the balance of resources that have constrained the conflict for a decade. The Reuters investigation into how the Houthis govern and extract economic and political advantage from territories they control underscores how territorial gains translate into longer term leverage.
On the humanitarian front the stakes are stark. The United Nations and its resident coordinators have repeatedly warned that a major assault on Marib threatens hundreds of thousands of civilians who have sought refuge there and could overwhelm humanitarian capacity in northeast Yemen. The UN’s own engagements in Marib have emphasized both the scale of internally displaced populations present in the governorate and the limited absorptive capacity of local systems. A collapse or rapid shift in front lines would therefore generate immediate protection and displacement pressures that would have cross-border implications.
Those cross-border implications fall into three linked risk categories for Saudi Arabia. First, direct kinetic spillover. The Houthis have demonstrated, over multiple campaigns, the ability to project force beyond Yemen’s borders using ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and armed drones. U.S. and coalition counterstrikes earlier in 2025 and prior Houthi strikes on regional targets underline that the group has operational reach and the willingness to use it when it judges its survival or political objectives to be at stake. That operational reach makes the Saudi southern provinces vulnerable to intermittent strikes if Marib’s fall is perceived by the Houthis as a strategic victory or if Riyadh increases its kinetic response.
Second, demographic pressure and irregular flows. Marib today hosts a large population of internally displaced persons who have fled violence elsewhere in Yemen. Any intensified offensive that drives new waves of displacement risks pushing people east and north toward border areas where humanitarian access is thin and local infrastructure is limited. Even absent a mass exodus into Saudi territory, the regional shock of expanded displacement would complicate Riyadh’s security planning, increase the humanitarian burden on Gulf donors, and create openings for smuggling and irregular cross-border movement that can destabilize border governance. The IOM displacement tracking data and UN warnings together make this dynamic visible on the ground.
Third, strategic escalation and the incentive structure. Capture of Marib would give the Houthis control over additional economic assets and population centres. That shift would alter the cost calculations for Saudi Arabia and its partners. Riyadh could choose to absorb the loss and refocus on containment, or it could expand military support to partners inside Yemen. Either choice carries risk. A posture of deepened military engagement invites more Houthi external operations as asymmetric retaliation. A posture of managed acquiescence risks encouraging further Houthi consolidation and emboldening regional spoilers who prefer a fragmented Yemen. Analysts have repeatedly argued that gains on the ground in Yemen change negotiating incentives and can prolong conflict when external patrons recalibrate support.
Policy implications for Saudi planners should be pragmatic and multi-layered. Short term, Riyadh will need to harden vulnerable border infrastructure and expand civilian protection measures in its southern provinces. That includes bolstering air defense and layered early warning, while simultaneously expanding civilian contingency planning for incremental arrivals of refugees or displaced households. Medium term, Saudi Arabia should coordinate with humanitarian agencies and regional partners to fund surge capacity in nearby safe zones inside Yemen and to ensure that assistance does not become a bargaining chip for combatants. The UN and donor-backed development engagements in Marib underscore the importance of linking humanitarian response to durable reconstruction programming.
Strategically, Riyadh must avoid binary choices that lock it into cycles of retaliation. Escalatory military responses can produce transnational blowback. Political and diplomatic options deserve equal emphasis. Saudi policy should combine calibrated deterrence with renewed investment in political pathways that can produce credible guarantees for Red Sea security, reductions in cross-border attacks, and an inclusive political settlement in Yemen. External actors, including the United States and Gulf partners, have a role in underwriting guarantees that reduce incentives for the Houthis to externalize their insecurity. Historical patterns from the past three years show that kinetic suppression alone does not eliminate the incentive structures that sustain Houthi external operations.
Finally, observers should not lose sight of the long term. The Marib contest is an example of how resource geography, displaced populations, and evolving weapons technology converge to create strategic risks that cannot be managed by short term tactical fixes alone. For Saudi Arabia and its partners the challenge is to build resilient border governance and to craft a regional political architecture that reduces the returns to territorial conquest inside Yemen. Absent such a shift, the Marib offensive will remain both a humanitarian tragedy and a vector for wider regional instability.