As of December 4, 2025 there are no verified open-source reports of a live-fire exercise in the Taiwan Strait producing a confirmed collision near-miss on that date. That absence matters, because what has been recorded across 2023-2025 shows a growing cadence of close encounters at sea and in the air that make any live-fire event far more dangerous than the label “exercise” implies.
Close encounters have moved from episodic to systemic. In 2025, multiple air and maritime incidents were publicly described by regional militaries and independent observers as dangerously close to collision, including an episode in June where Japanese authorities reported a Chinese J-15 fighter made unusually close approaches to a Japanese maritime patrol aircraft. Those cases illustrate how routine operational tasks, when layered onto live-fire activity, raise the chance of an accidental escalation.
Live-fire drills amplify two structural risk factors. First, exercises use munitions, live rockets, and populated firing lanes that reduce the margin for error; debris, misfires, or incorrectly deconflicted trajectories can endanger commercial shipping and nearby platforms. Second, the crowded operational environment of the Taiwan Strait - with military escorts, coast guard patrols, fishing vessels, and commercial traffic - multiplies second- and third-order interactions where simple navigational errors or aggressive tactical manoeuvres can cascade into a crisis.
Beijing has repeatedly integrated large-scale drills and high-tempo operations around Taiwan into its peacetime training repertoire during 2024 and 2025. U.S. and allied analyses have warned that these patterns are rehearsing blockade and interdiction options and that the PLA’s posture now more frequently puts live ordnance and routine patrols into proximity with international traffic. Those strategic trends increase both the frequency of close approaches and the stakes of any accidental contact.
A plausible near-miss during live-fire could take several forms: a surface vessel forced to take evasive action across an active firing lane, a missile or rocket stage falling into a shipping lane, or an aircraft executing an aggressive intercept while artillery or rocket salvos are in the water nearby. Any one of those scenarios can generate immediate loss of life and, equally important, a political contagion that affirms hostile intent and thereby shortens decision cycles across capitals.
The legal and operational frameworks intended to prevent such accidents are fragmented. International rules for avoiding collisions at sea (COLREGs) apply between vessels, but they are less well adapted to interactions that mix warship manoeuvres, coast guard law enforcement, and live ordnance trajectories. Air intercept rules and international aviation notices can help, but they depend on timely notification and shared situational awareness. Where states decline to share detailed exercise zones or contest the very legal status of waters and airspace, deconfliction breaks down and near-misses become systemic rather than incidental.
Policy responses should run on two tracks: tactical risk reduction and strategic deescalation. On the tactical side, immediate measures that reduce collision risk during live-fire events include: 1) mandatory, timely NOTAMs and maritime warnings that are specific about coordinates and windows for live ordnance; 2) pre-exercise safety corridors for commercial traffic enforced by military and coast guard authorities; 3) real-time information sharing between militaries and civilian maritime authorities using agreed technical channels; and 4) a standing incident-response protocol with a neutral investigation mechanism when accidents or near-misses occur.
On the strategic side, the international community needs to close the normative gap that currently treats increasingly coercive live-fire operations as routine signalling. States with leverage over Beijing and Taipei, and external stakeholders that rely on the Strait for trade, should press for an Asia-Pacific code of conduct for live-fire exercises that includes transparency requirements, third-party observers for certain large-scale drills, and commitments to avoid firing into or through established commercial lanes. Confidence-building measures like regular hotlines, predictable patrol schedules, and shared tracking feeds for commercial operators can reduce misperception and the pressure to retaliate immediately.
A final point concerns deterrence and resilience. Taiwan and its partners must prepare for the reality that live-fire drills are being used as a coercive tool. That means investing in systems and operating procedures that make civilian harm less likely and rapid attribution more certain. Better attribution lowers the threshold for measured diplomatic responses and reduces the incentive for precipitous military retaliation.
A near-miss during a live-fire exercise in the Taiwan Strait would therefore be much more than a local safety incident. It would be a stress test of deconfliction mechanisms, crisis communication channels, and the political will of regional actors to keep competition below the threshold of armed conflict. Preventing that outcome requires practical safety reforms now, not after tragedy forces them into being.